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Abstract
It is argued that Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem should be seen as
self-evident, rather than unexpected or surprising.
A Surprising Shock and its widespread disregard
Recently has been celebrated the centenary of the birth of Kurt Go¨del,
[N]. That occasion also recalls the 75 years since the publication of his
famous paper on incompleteness. At the time, in the 1930s, there
were still strong reverberations in Mathematics following the para-
doxes in Set Theory discovered some decades earlier around the turn
of the century. Three main directions of thought had emerged in this
regard. They were the so called ”logicism”, following Frege, Russell
and Whitehead, ”formalism” supported by Hilbert, and the somewhat
less main line but rather radical ”intuitionism” strongly promoted by
Brouwer.
Logicism did not prove to be highly popular among mathematicians,
since not many were ready to accept the idea that Logic contained all
of Mathematics, thus there was nothing more in Mathematics than
could be encompassed by Logic. Intuitionism proved even less popu-
lar, due to the most severe restrictions it imposed even on Logic, let
alone on Mathematics.
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In this way, to some extent by default, Hilbert formalism came to
prominence, only to be severely questioned by Go¨del’s 1931 incom-
pleteness result which, in everyday terms, states that ”Every suffi-
ciently strong axiomatic theory which is consistent must be incom-
plete”, [F].
At the time, and to a good extent ever since, this incompleteness the-
orem has been considered by so many among mathematicians who
encounter it for the first time as being most surprisingly unexpected,
and in fact, rather unsettling. As it happens, however, most of the
usual mathematicians consider that, regardless of the mentioned fea-
tures of the incompleteness theorem, they can quite safely disregard
it within their everyday professional pursuit.
Needless to say, Hilbert himself tried assiduously to diminish, if not
completely dismiss, its obvious impact on his program of formalism.
What is self-evident should in fact not at all surprise ...
And yet, what may appear to be no less surprising, this incomplete-
ness theorem should at a somewhat better and deeper consideration
be self-evident, instead of being seen so surprising ...
However, what prevents it from being self-evident is a long time and
most powerfully entrenched, even if not quite perceived ”cut” in the
way thinking in Mathematics, as well as in so many other realms, is
being practiced.
And by its very nature, Mathematics, or for that matter, Mathemat-
ical Logic, manifests this ”cut” in a most trenchant manner.
The ever ongoing ”cut” ...
So then, what is this ”cut” all about ?
For convenience, let us consider it in the case of Mathematics. Typ-
ically, and in fact, rather without any exception, what is considered
to be Mathematics, as for instance in its form publishable in profes-
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sional journals, is one thing, while mathematical thinking which leads
to such Mathematics is seen to be quite another. There may be just
about one not particularly central exception, namely, with conjectures
or open problems. However, they can hardly be published as such and
all alone in professional journals. Instead, they are supposed to be
supported by a convincing argument along the lines of what is consid-
ered to be Mathematics.
And what is considered to be Mathematics has to be a rigorous, logi-
cally developed system based on earlier definitions and proven results,
plus possibly new definitions, and of course, the required new results.
As for axioms, they are supposed to be clear in the given context, or
occasionally, new ones may be put forward.
Indeed, from this point of view what is to be Mathematics is at least
as clear as it may ever happen with anything else in science.
But then, most obviously, hardly any mathematician does ever do
Mathematics in this way. And to make things easier to understand,
let us use the analogy of what is going on even in the very best restau-
rants.
The dishes are prepared in the kitchen, and then taken to the eating
hall where the customers sit at the neat tables, and where the dishes
are served up in front of them in a spectacularly appetizing manner.
Of course, the customers are not supposed to have even a look, let
alone go, into the kitchen where things are quite inevitably really
messy ...
A similar ”cut” between the ”kitchen” and the ”eating hall” happens
in Mathematics as well, and does so quite inevitably.
And needless to say, just like with restaurants, the creative mathe-
matical activity happens in the ”kitchen”, which can be the thinking
of one single mathematician, or of a group who collaborate with one
another.
The other side of the ”cut” ...
Strangely enough, however, what goes on in such ”kitchens” is seldom
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brought to the attention of the profession. And even less so of what
has gone wrong in such ”kitchens”. Yet that process of ”cooking” new
Mathematics - or in general, science - is not only essential, but often
it can also be essentially different from what is at the end seen in the
”eating halls”. And in this regard we can mention several aspects, the
following three of which can be most important, no matter how much
they may happen to be overlooked.
Self-referentiality. In present day Mathematics, or for that matter,
Mathematical Logic, so called ”circular definitions” are not quite wel-
come, in spite of recent research in this direction, [B-M]. However,
within mathematical thinking, that is, inside the ”kitchen”, nothing
stops one from indulging in self-referential concepts. After all, the
famous 1903 Russell paradox is but the expression of such a thinking
in terms of Set Theory.
Instantaneity. Here, turning to Physics may better help in under-
standing, [R]. It is a basic principle of both Special and General Rel-
ativity that no physical action whatever, including information trans-
mission can occur faster than the speed of light, [C-K]. And yet, in
the thinking of anybody, physicists or not, one can simultaneously
conceive of arbitrarily faraway objects which may possibly act upon
one another. As for Quantum Mechanics, one can conceive of two en-
tangled quantum particles arbitrarily far from one another, yet with
a correlation of their states, which means that in one’s thinking one
can instantaneously register the fact that, given the state of one of the
particles, the state of the other one is determined.
Unattributable sources. A good deal of original scientific ideas appear
in one’s mind as if from nowhere. Furthermore, often one cannot trace
precisely their origin and process of emergence into a constituted idea
even with hindsight.
Should Incompleteness still be such a surprise ?
Let us consider Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem as relating to the
Peano axioms of natural numbers. It implies that there are state-
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ments S which, together with their negation non-S, do not follow as
theorems in that theory. In this way, the respective theory of natural
numbers branches at S and non-S, in the sense that one can add to the
Peano axioms S and obtain one theory of natural numbers, or alterna-
tively, one can add non-S and, clearly, obtain a rather different theory.
The decision which of such two branches to take does of course happen
in the ”kitchen”. And there, any of the mentioned three phenomena
can manifest itself, not mention other ones not considered above. And
clearly, the third of the above phenomena - namely, the possible pres-
ence of unattributable sources of our ideas - can be a prime source of
incompleteness.
Consequently, the moment we no longer consider Mathematics as be-
ing all of it contained only on the ”eating hall” side of that long
ongoing and disregarded ”cut”, that very moment we can only be sur-
prised how and why we did not hit prior to Go¨del upon a variety of
incompleteness results.
Not many ”cuts” outside of hard science ...
It may be important to enquire why such a ”cut” exists, persists, and
fails to be noted, let alone, taken into account in various sciences.
One immediate reason can be the following. Outside of sciences - and
here one means ”hard sciences” - that ”cut” hardly exists. In other
words, the respective ”restaurants” do not have the sharp division of
”kitchen” and ”eating hall”.
Indeed, in non-intellectual realms, such as sport for instance, such a
division would in fact be highly counterproductive.
As for a large variety of intellectual realms, including philosophy or
”soft sciences”, even if such a ”cut” may be claimed to exist, that
claim is questionable. And even if that ”cut” may to some extent be
present, it happens - even if often regrettably so - not to be particu-
larly important in fact.
In this way, since the practice of modern ”hard science” is relatively
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new in human history, it may be less surprising that the mentioned
”cut” has passed insufficiently noticed, let alone considered in its im-
plications.
As for the fact that Mathematics is a couple of millennia older than
modern ”hard science”, and nevertheless it still does not give enough
attention to that ”cut”, one can only speculate about the reason pos-
sibly being in the singular - and thus, insufficiently consequential -
character of Mathematics within human experience at large, as well
as within the life experience of individual mathematicians.
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